**A Rough Draft: Toward the Application of a Dialectical Social Ecology**

I wanted to share some writing I've been undertaking after our meetings on dialectic and reading the “Preface to a Dialectical Social Ecology.” It starts relatively coherent and then unravels into fragments and some language that I find a little too flowery and need to tighten up. I just wanted to share some of these thoughts to see if I'm hopefully on a decent path with it. I hope it to be an entry, or series of entries for my "Better Worlds, Brighter Futures" blog [a social ecological project of mine that has existed in various forms since perhaps 2008 or so] that explains the general methodology of that project, and potential applications coming from such a frame.

**Applying a Dialectical Social Ecological Analysis**

"What is to be done?" That famous question continues to be the burning one. How are we to analyze, assess, and act in a world where the social and ecological metabolisms are feverishly accelerating? We must identify the forces at play, assess their trajectories, and pinpoint strategic junctures at which we can intervene.

Some of these forces are self-evident: they are present in our news, our politics, our economy, our environment, our households, our relationships. Other, more subterranean forces may only present themselves under the scrutiny imposed by an analytical frame.

**Our Methodology**

The *Better Worlds, Brighter Futures* methodology is social ecological and dialectical. For our analyses we will use John Clark's framework: what factors and forces are present and at work in the institutional, ideological, imaginary, and ethotic (ethos/ethic) realms within society? How do they interact, antagonize, oppose, compliment, or cancel each other? How do they manifest on the level of the individual or psychological, the communal, the social, and the ecological? What are the impacts of the temporality or history of these phenomena? Ultimately, where within the interstices of this dialectical matrix can we strategically intervene to alter outcomes toward the creation of the revolutionary, liberated, ecological, loving human community?

The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world, in various ways; the point is to *change* it.

Karl Marx, 11th Thesis on Feuerbach

With Marx's 11th Thesis in mind, we analyze toward an end: the social ecological reharmonization of society with nature, and humanity with itself. The ultimate goal? For humanity to use its evolutionarily-endowed capacities--for reason, compassion, ethics--to become "nature rendered self-conscious;" [I’ll need to reformulate this a bit after Clark disucsses the shortcomings of this in his “Preface”] that is, the mind of the natural world able to contemplate itself and act in ways that foster its health, growth, development, and preservation. From more fully exercising those capacities bestowed upon us through evolutionary processes--the capacities that make us unique in the same way that makes all species unique and distinct--a simultaneous, dual development occurs: we become at once more human, and more *natural*. Such has been the vision of social ecological thinkers dating back at least to Elisee Reclus within the European tradition.

One could argue that such a development is the ultimate aim of communism, or that it is an even more radical furtherance of a communist society. Either way, this is why the social ecological tradition is of the revolutionary left and draws from the entirety of the libertarian socialist tradition, from Marx to Kropotkin and beyond.

Though there is a subjective end for social ecology, this isn't used to force phenomena under investigation into a predetermined frame. Rather, this subjective end is kept in mind while objectively analyzing phenomena in order to identify points of interjection that can help bring about this end. As well, it can be argued that the end identified by a dialectical social ecology is perhaps the only one that is capable of mitigating the worst of the ecological crisis and ensure the sustainable and harmonized existence of both humanity and nature.

**The Dialectic for a Social Ecology**

Most simplistically, dialectics is the study of relation--the complementarity, the opposition, and the interpenetration of forces at play. This brings a dialectical method of investigation into close affinity with the science of ecology, which in its broadest sense is the study of relation; traditionally, the study of the relationship between an organism and its environment. There is a very dialectical element to ecology, and a very ecological element to dialectical exploration.

Dialectics is one way of exploring ontological concepts such as *Being* and *Becoming*, as well as moments of negation, preservation, and transcendence within and between phenomena. In many ways, dialectics is the study of forces in motion, although this motion is not necessarily linear, developmental, or "progressive" (a term that has come under attack as part of the war on Modernity, though has often been misused by its proponents and should be subject to critique).

Indeed, as John Clark has shown in his "Domesticating the Dialectic: A Critique of Bookchin's Neo-Aristotelian Metaphysics," to assume an inherent directionality to phenomena is to "domesticate" an otherwise "wild" or objective dialectic and reduce it to what amounts to a teleological unfolding of immanent potentiality within a phenomenon.

Teleology itself is a complicated concept that is often associated with dialectic, sometimes intentionally but often unknowingly (as is the case with Bookchin, as demonstrated in Clark and Janet Biehl's debate surrounding "Domesticating."). In G.W.F. Hegel's *Phenomenology*, his absolute idealism perspective saw Spirit moving inexorably through a meandering development until ultimately reaching the *Absolute*, or a point of totality from which no further contradiction (and therefore development) can arise.

Similarly, Karl Marx's dialectical materialism saw humanity passing through several necessary stages of relations to production before finally culminating in the arrival of communism: a society of non-alienated labor producing for need and use rather than want and exchange, and guided by the maxim "from each according to ability, to each according to need."

But the life of Spirit is not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself untouched by devastation, but rather the life that endures it and maintains itself in it. It wins its truth only when, in utter dismemberment, it finds itself. It is this power, not as something positive, which closes its eyes to the negative, as when we say of something that it is nothing or is false, and then, having done with it, turn away and pass on to something else; on the contrary, Spirit is this power only by looking the negative in the face, and tarrying with it. This tarrying with the negative is the magical power that converts it into being….

G.W.F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*

[These next two paragraphs need a lot of reworking, or might be excluded altogether]  
Yet, while Hegel seems to imply that there are no shortcuts or effortless answers, and that Being Becomes only through tarrying with that negative that threatens to destroy it, might this also be teleological? Is not Hegel pointing a finger toward the abyss, showing there is no alternative for Spirit other than to tarry with the negative? Would a radical, non-teleological dialectic be open to the possibility of Spirit not engaging the negative, yet somehow also avoiding stasis and allowing development to continue? But here we fall back into a one-dimensional unfolding of immanent potentiality, rather than the development and forward motion that can only arise from engaging with that which threatens to turn Being into something other than itself, and losing its identity. Here, we may be talking of matters of scale, degrees, or intensities--substantive development comes about only through engaging substantively with the negative and coming out the other side--the only way out is through.

There are no shortcuts. But rather than arriving at a totalizing end of history or passing through necessary and inevitable stages of productive relations we are left with a more open development. Instead of an absolute culmination, or even a more open, ever-receding horizon, we aim to pull the very rug and floor out from under any linear path. As John Clark has argued, it is precisely these teleological moments that are least dialectical. This poses a challenge at attempts of compiling "grand narratives," and another challenge to Modernity. Instead of linearity, with horizons and destinations being marched toward, we have development without directionality. Rather than a landscape with a gravity and a ground from which we can orient ourselves, we have a churning sphere of motion and movement without any fixed parameters or ability to establish bearings. However, we must also keep in mind that without this floor we don't fall into meaninglessness and nihilism, but float. Temporality, "progress," development, and directionality have a different meaning here, or no meaning whatsoever. At least in the objective analysis of humanity and history. [Perhaps bearings and direction must be left to the subjective?]

Other points: We can look to Indo-Asian philosophy, particularly Zen Buddhism or Taoism for an arguably more radical, non-teleological dialectic that still avoids falling through the floor into nihilism.

I want to talk about the positive of negative dialectic. How the negation of self or ego can get us to community and collective rather than nothingness. "Negating upward." How the negative can be, not "harnessed," which implies a sense of control or domestication, but reacted to in certain ways that can alter outcomes. Like in Aikido, moving and adjusting to the other and using the enemy's momentum against them for the least harmful outcome to both.

Also the concept of the remainder challenges Hegel's absolute idealism.

The state of existence is a state of contradiction between animation and the inert. Life itself is a contradiction and an overcoming of death. Discuss Fromm and his "problems of human existence."  
  
**Other Fragments that Will Become Topics in Their Own Right--Discussing Prevailing Forces at Play**

Even before laying this dialectical, social ecological groundwork, we can identify several prevailing forces affecting the social and political landscape of the United States.

* Against the Parties of Reaction and Recuperation (posted: https://betterworldsblog.com/against-the-parties-of-reaction-recuperation)
  + Briefly laying out the ways in which the Democrats and Republicans are two sides of the same coin; Biden’s ineffectiveness at substantively addresses the social issues that led to the rise of Trump, and could lead to another Trump sooner than later.
* Neither Monopoly Capital nor Far-Right Alliance
  + Talking about the liberal alliance with big-tech to deplatform far-right voices in ways that enhance the monopoly and reduce the competition between large tech firms; while simultaneously also not running to the defense of, or find common cause with the far-right on this issue.
  + Varoufakis claims we are in a post-capitalist, "techno-feudal" system now
* Cancel Culture or Consequences?
  + I think the idea of “cancel culture” is a straw man. Whom that has been “cancelled” has been forced into homelessness or permanent unemployment? What voices are being prevented from being heard? Can’t “cancel culture” just be seen as having consequences for holding shitty views? Of course, who is to say what constitutes shittiness? But this is also tied in with antifa—the idea is to make is so miserable to be a fascist, and the consequences so dire, that fascists move away from that ideology; and not giving them space to promote or popularize their views. Also the idea that a completely tolerant culture would necessarily lead to fascism, and the importance of being intolerant of intolerance.
* Fascism Thrives in Ambiguity
  + Definition is important; "post-truth," "alternate facts" must be rejected; we must be precise with our language
  + The idea that words now mean their opposite: "patriots" are authoritarian and undemocratic in support of supposedly American values/ideals; anti-democratic opposition to democratic elections supposedly in support of preserving democratic values, but really a mask for sore-loser authoritarians; appropriation of language for nefarious ends that reinforce illogic, resistance to reason, and the birth of irrational ideologies
* Relatedly, the Q cult and the move toward the irrational and mass hysterical
  + What can be said of the individual/psychological processes at play? On the one hand, many of these followers have families that they distance themselves from in favor of other Qultists; on the other, it speaks to a desire for community (among other factors like wanting to feel important through having privileged or insider knowledge); Erich Fromm can help us here with the individual and social psychological appeal of fascist and authoritarian ideologies.
  + An analysis of far-right international tendencies aligned with the Trump movement that aim to destabilize the United States and its government, with no sort of ethical concern for the poor, working class, or oppressed in the US that are in danger and would be harmed if the far-right consolidated power in any major way. Again, Dugin (<http://www.4pt.su/en/content/manifesto-great-awakening-against-great-reset>).
* Novel and unconventional aspects within ecology:
  + laying out the problematic of conservation biology with its view of wilderness as static landscape (an argument Bookchin made but didn’t take far enough) and what belongs where (identifying “alien,” “native,” “invasive” species which can be argued is an anti-ecological position often resulting in mitigation techniques worse than the supposed negative affects of “invasive” species themselves);
  + overcoming the distinction and demonization of species dispersal by humans which can actually lead to increasing biodiversity, speciation, plugging holes left open in ecosystems by recent extinctions, and novel methods for mitigating and overcoming the ecological crisis and reharmonizing the human-nature relation;
  + bringing the complementary work of Lynn Margulis (serial endosymbiotic theory/symbiogenesis), Stephen Jay Gould (punctuated equilibria), and others into a new or expanded evolutionary synthesis that allows the groundwork for a social ecological theory of value, emphasizes the prevalence of mutualism/cooperation/symbiosis in nature, powerfully argues against the supremacy of competition and human institutions built on this misperception of nature;
  + a social ecological, anti-capitalist version of “reconciliation ecology,” wherein human dominated ecosystems (cities, etc.) are redeveloped in ways that support the flourishing of both human and non-human life;
  + working with and within the limitations of nature to foster speciation, biodiversity, etc as ecological “goods” in the social ecological theory of value (such as selective breeding rather than genetic engineering to potentially “breed back” species from extinction as well as undo the non-harmonious, human-controlled evolution of most domesticated species, allowing them to either be more harmoniously domesticated or potentially undomesticated altogether—see Heck Cattle)
  + the social ecology of Paul Ewold regarding the ability to control through natural selection the virulence of different pathogens by providing high quality human infrastructure (such as access to clean water and sanitation)

**The Contradiction of Wildlife Conservation and Ex-Situ Conservation of Species**

The contradiction between conservation of wildlife and species in their current habitat and ex-situ conservation driven largely by the capitalist notion of private property. For example, the struggle to preserve an endangered, endemic wild flower in Nevada. The Center for Biological Diversity has sued to prevent mining interests from mining on the last bit of land inhabited by these wild flowers. While the possibility may exist to keep the species alive via ex-situ conservation, to suggest this in legal proceedings would be to undercut the argument of the need to preserve the land, increasing the potential for success of the mining interests. However, this becomes an “all or nothing” strategy, wherein species extinction would occur if the court case is lost. Here, it seems, priorities and distinctions must be made between the preservation of species and the preservation of landscape.

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**Thoughts on Clark’s “Preface to a Dialectical Social Ecology” Part I**

Greetings John, I wanted to send some thoughts on your "Preface" that I've gotten to so far. I've read from the Introduction to *Natura Naturans*. I find it very exciting and look forward to the extended work on a dialectical social ecology.

I've found the argument for our era to be called the Necrocene very compelling. One of the things that resonated with me in Bookchin was his insistence that it was not humanity "as such" that was to be indicted for the ecological crisis. [But those that have disproportionate power within capitalism and the state, in the ability to “externalize” costs to maximize profits through pollution and deregulation of industry. This is against the liberal notion of blaming/shaming the habits of poor and working people for not engaging in consumption based practices like recycling, while overlooking the fact that with the stroke of a pen a CEO or politician can cause exponentially more ecological damage than a regular person that litters their candy wrappers, for instance. We shouldn’t litter, of course, but also must recognize that we aren’t equally culpable and resist tendencies to want to blame poor and working people trying to survive in a system not of their choosing—whether in the US or toward developing nations themselves.] I also appreciate how, instead of naming this geological epoch after one of the primary causes of ecological crisis you maintain the scientific convention of naming and juxtapose a Necrocene to the Cenozoic. Very fitting without obfuscating.

We've spoken and discussed in the DSE group much of your discussion on dialectic, which I also appreciate. It shows I still have limitations in my understanding to overcome, as the fragments I shared with you earlier will expose.

I had two notes on the concepts in the paragraph just above the "Dialectic As Liberation" header that begins "Such superficial interpretations fail..." that I wrote from a previous reading of this portion:

The idea that "things" are ultimately empty of inherent existence and can only be defined in abstraction through a network of relations is ecological; that these relations can also be seen as dialectical forces in play. This abstracted thing is similar to what I think of as negative definition (defining a chair, for instance, by describing every aspect of non-chair or not-this-chair and being left with the inference of this chair)--it is describing *around* a thing, because the thing can't ultimately be described, because emptiness has no other property--it is negation. Also, Zenji's "a true nature that is no nature" is, on a certain level, a unity of opposites in regards to what a thing *is* (its true nature) and *is not* (no nature at all)--in this moment of transcendence, they are synonymous.

A related note, but from a line in "It is What It Isn't," is that, perhaps in order to avoid "the reduction of dialectic to the interaction between polarized contradictions," we can use terms like "forces at play?" I think this way of conceiving phenomena under investigation recognizes the possibility of a multiplicity of factors or forces in play that might affect: the thing under analysis, each of which may affect the thing, and affect each other while affecting the thing, or the thing affecting them. Instead of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, which I know you avoid, and perhaps even negation, preservation, transcendence (which I think is a very helpful conception), what if we spoke in terms of volume/intensity, interference, and attenuation? Perhaps like a car in motion with the radio on--the signal for a station can get stronger or weaker (volume/intensity, attenuation), or bleed into and interact with another frequency/station (interference), or can be changed to a different frequency altogether but only after, in an analog fashion, passing through the other frequencies (quantity into quality). These don't exactly parallel negation, preservation, and transcendence, and indeed might be problematic ultimately.

I love the practice of dialectic as both traumatic and therapeutic for the practitioner and the world.

I think there are many elements that could be said to "animate" dialectical movement--negation leading to preservation and transcendence, but always unevenly or uncleanly leaving a remainder to kick up additional contradiction, but stated another way, it can be seen as a process of continued, "*ultimate* inadequacy" as you mention further along in the text.

[I’ll leave this in to show my ignorance of critical theory. John replied to this, and can no doubt mention his response if we happen to discuss this in a meeting.] I'll need to re-read Marcuse's "A Note on Dialectic." I have his *Reason and Revolution*. I might need some additional discussion for me to be more comfortable with this. Maybe I just need the full context of the piece. But the portion "the effort to break the power of facts over the word," seems precisely what we have today and what we need less of in a world of "post-truth" and "alternative facts" and tendencies toward conspiracism and irrationality. I'm not sure what to do here, as this kind of puts me in perhaps a non-dialectical moment of feeling we need better definition and precision with words in support of facts. Though I guess the idea is that facts themselves could be an aspect of ideology that support the current systems of power and oppression. I could see some merit to asking "whose facts," or who benefits from these facts, but I fear the nuance of this would get lost in a world as chaotic, polarized, and politicized as it currently stands, at least in the U.S.

*"Over fifty years ago in 'Ecology and Revolutionary Thought' Bookchin presciently argued for the revolutionary implications of the science of ecology. Yet, it took some time for social ecologists to begin moving beyond the obsolete 'balance of nature' model that was invoked frequently in that essay, and the literature of social ecology since then has seldom attempted to come to terms with the most radical developments in contemporary science, not to mention contemporary philosophy."*

This gives me a jumping off point that I think I can help to develop. In Bookchin's essay cited in this paragraph, he refers to Charles Elton, and I think this is responsible for many internal inconsistencies within his social ecology. Prior, in *Our Synthetic Environment* he also references Elton. [I believe Elton is also referenced in *The Philosophy of Social Ecology.*]Elton, of course was the founder of "invasion ecology," and a proponent of hierarchical and militaristic ways of viewing the natural world. I believe Elton would've agreed with Darwin's metaphor of the wedge, wherein an ecosystem is tightly ordered and balanced and in order for another species to gain entry, it must get a foothold, eventually driving another species out [which sets up the conservative approach to conservation/invasion biology of attempting to determine what species “belong” in a given landscape, which are alien, native, invasive, etc]. Anyway, people like Stephen Jay Gould have shown there is much more to ecosystems in terms of relation than this. If we could surgically remove Elton's influence on Bookchin's conceptions within ecology, this would open us up to recognizing the stochasticity within natural systems, allow for a critique of conservation biology (which, against Elton, Bookchin partially undertook) and especially "invasion biology," and open a path to mitigating, ecological interventions for the preservation of species and biodiversity (such as ex-situ conservation and social ecological theories of species dispersal). I hope I can glean additional insight from David Theodoropoulos's *Invasion Biology: Critique of a Pseudoscience* and Fred Pearce's *The New Wild.*

Perhaps it isn't really needed for the *Preface,* but I would like to see some more in-depth, explicit discussion of teleology, its historic relation to dialectic, and how, as you've argued elsewhere, some of the most famous aspects of dialectical thinkers are actually teleological and the least dialectical moments of their thought. And how this recognition leads us to a transformation in understanding of certain concepts such as temporality, directionality, development, "progress." I tried to begin this in the fragments I sent you. Perhaps I'm getting overly semantical, but to me, ruthlessly excising all aspects of teleology would remove directionality or linearity, so not only would development not end in an absolute (also due to the presence of a remainder), we couldn't even speak of an open, ever-receding horizon. If this is the case, I imagine something like a sphere in which movement can occur in all directions, and even references to a "field" would imply a horizontality or plane from which one can find orientation, and/or a "gravity" that allows us to go in a certain direction along that plane. Of course, I think you're referring to a different type of field--more of energy than a field of clover. Like a gravitational field that can be thought of as a sheet within or over which bodies with gravitational mass distort and ripple the sheet. But even this may be problematic, as gravity is thought to also have a verticality, in that it may be present through multiple dimensions of space, and the force of gravity in our three dimensional world may be an attenuated instance of this force that is more intensely present elsewhere. Perhaps it is just a preference of visual imagery.

This is all for now. I've quite enjoyed your piece so far. Hopefully some of these thoughts are helpful to you.

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**Thoughts on Clark’s “Preface to a Dialectical Social Ecology” Part II**

I have a few thoughts on the rest of your "Preface," which I enjoyed very much. These thoughts aren't very critical, and so I don't know how helpful they will be.  
  
In the last paragraph of the *Natura Naturans* section discussing mutual aid, Lynn Margulis's work (itself an independent rediscovery of Kozo-Polyanski, who is still obscure in English speaking countries) may further reinforce your point regarding the primacy and importance of mutual aid at the material, biological, cellular level. Her serial endosymbiotic theory, or theory of symbiogenesis, proved that nucleated cells, and all complex life, came about due to physical fusions of originally separate microorganisms. Our very cells are symbionts. I think this has philosophical implications, as well, for concepts of identity and individuality, and ways in which we are not ourselves.  
  
Moving on to the value theory: A holonistic understanding of value would seek the "good" and understand their dialectical interaction on the individual, community/population, ecosystem, species, and "Gaian" scales in both the human and natural realms. In the natural realm, and again holonistically, these "goods" can be seen as dialectically interacting instances that as a whole can be seen as, or as contributing to, "flourishing," which itself is similar to, but distinguished from "intrinsic good." As "good" is a value, this can be seen as *an* intrinsic value of nature, but is still different from *the* intrinsic value of nature, or treating nature as having intrinsic value. I think *the* intrinsic value of nature would value nature simply because it is natural (or life simply because it is alive), whether or not such nature or life sought or worked toward the intrinsic good or flourishing which must be intrinsic generally in order for life to maintain and perpetuate. (Here, it seems, at least one intrinsic good would be Darwinian--reproduction, which is the most common definition of "fitness" within evolutionary biology, but is somewhat problematic and reductionist.)  
  
How are we to identify processes of flourishing intrinsic to nature? I think we can derive ecological "goods" in those elements that promote *health* in all scales you mention: organism, community/population, species, ecosystem, planetary/Gaian. These would include reproduction, speciation, biodiversity, possibly complexity, no doubt others. Notably, I think these would *not* include whatever values within conservation biology seek to preserve wilderness as stasis, or tightly control the distribution and migration of species, or determine what "belongs" where or whether things can hybridize.

As well, I wonder if this social ecological value theory could be reduced to, or misunderstood as, an instance of positive utilitarianism? Or perhaps it is that? I wonder how such a value theory could overcome situations of "the greatest good for the greatest number" that often results in the overall good being reduced so that all or most can share in a part of it? Such a dialectical value theory would need to somehow preserve the greatest good for the individual while also attaining the greatest good for all the other scales simultaneously. I guess "greatest" is different than "maximum" in the sense that the greatest good possible might be less than the maximally achievable good, once filtered through the considerations of others, and at other scales. But it seems if we derive our values from that which are intrinsically good to the living and organic at all scales, we would find a unity or universalism based on these underlying biological principles, in which case the maximally achievable good for the individual would reinforce and be reinforced by, the maximally achievable goods at all scales.

Also, I feel that this social ecological theory of value avoids the naturalistic fallacy (I know this is what you are trying to achieve). Is this because we are not deriving an ought from an is simply because it *is*, but because, given the multiplicity of "ises," we as human beings *choose* what ises to derive goodness from? Is human capacity for choice--itself an evolutionarily-endowed capacity--the function that allows us to skirt the naturalistic fallacy? But then, are we just begging the question? What justifies our choice of these values, based on an understanding of the underlying processes of nature and existence, over any others we might have selected? Still, I think this gets us further than those who would say "competition exists in nature, therefore competition is good, and therefore capitalism is natural." For us, it is: given the facts of mutualism and competition existing in nature, we *choose* to uphold mutualism as a good, *because*..."  
  
I find the distinctions between hierarchy and domination and of dominating and non-dominating hierarchies very exciting. I think this would be controversial within anarchist milieus. And social ecological ones. This does many things: ethically prioritizes domination over otherwise unequal but benign instances of authority and hierarchy (Kovel's example of teacher-student, other sorts of virtue-based ethics, etc); leaves room for authority and hierarchy in the context of non-domination (such an understanding could lead to more successful and organized instances of "libertarian" community self-defense, for example, as well as education); helps us to more clearly identify domination within human social structures; brings Kovel into social ecology proper; and begins a more substantive synthesis of libertarian Marxism with anarchism than does "Communalism."

I think preferencing domination also alters, in some ways, the contemporary understanding of anarchism without necessarily going outside of it. Obviously, you talk of eco-anarchism in your "Preface." It seems like preferencing domination over authority and hierarchy leaves room for, or even emphasizes, anarchist organization and reinforces the understanding held by anarchist-communists and perhaps especially Nestor Makhno, and stands in contrast to those anarchists that see organization of any kind as problematic.  
  
While the four realms of social determination and the dialectical relationship between them will no doubt be the most difficult for most to understand and work with, I think as a whole this preface is a wonderful theoretical grounding that points a direction toward a plurality of practical actions. It points us to the values we should be adopting in our lives and in our radical communities, the areas to target in attempting to mitigate the worst of ecological crisis, forms of organization rooted in care and compassion, and much more. I wish I had a physical group of people to study and act on this. I hope we get to this in the DSE group, from which we can all form physical groups to begin the important work. There are so many implications, from things like Earth First (I know you mention them elsewhere) to other projects, but with this social ecological understanding and with these social ecological ends in mind.